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Abstract
In a fully self-enforcing environment, individuals can execute market transac-
tions exclusively on the basis of trust. However, the presence of individuals
showing self-regarding preferences causes serious impediments to the develop-
ment and even the existence of market transactions. An enforcing legal system
helps to control for the lack of trust existing in every modern society. The arti-
cle provides a theoretical investigation accompanied by a numerical simulation
of the impact of the introduction of a costly legal system that makes contracts
binding. Therefore, it investigates the choice between legally binding contracts,
which are costly to verify and enforce, and non-binding contracts, which sim-
ply rely on trust, in both one-shot and repeated interactions. We nd that a
legal system protecting property rights mainly produces benets when e¤ort is
particularly valuable. In the other circumstances, the benets are marginal. A
subset of parameters also exists in which the legal system is detrimental. This is
especially the case of standardized production. Finally, reputation unleashes its
welfare-enhancing properties when e¤ort is very valuable, otherwise the benets
are trivial.
Keywords: contract choice; trust; contract enforceability; reputation; in-
complete contracts.
JEL: C70; D02; D03; D86; K12.
1 Introduction
Contract law textbooks usually suggest that if the parties are gentlemen, con-
tracts could simply be nalized by a handshake. These contracts rely on the
honorability and honesty of the counterparties, which give rise to trust as an
enforcement mechanism.1 In the words of Arrow (1974), trust is indeed an
important lubricant of the social system. Nevertheless, according to a saying
recalled by Grosheide (1998: 91), "honor does not belong to the province of civil
law" and some individuals can act strategically and decide whether to fulll or
to breach an agreement if it is legally non-binding. Therefore, we can generally
distinguish two types of individuals: one type showing "emotional" preferences
and precommitting to behave honestly; another type acting without precommit-
ment according to self-regarding preferences and representing a serious setback
to self-enforceability and even to the emergence of markets.2
One of the main purposes of a legal system is to provide alternative devices
to solve the crucial problem of contract enforcement. As highlighted by Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005), without legal institutions to enforce contracts, trade
may turn out to be ine¢ cient if rational individuals do not trust their counter-
party to carry out the agreed transaction. However, contracts are often di¢ cult
to enforce, regardless of the object of the transaction. The main reason is that
contracts are usually incomplete, making it very costly for parties to invest in
enforcement by legal means (Spier, 1992; Irlenbusch, 2006). Examples are easy
to nd in agricultural contracts, family law, house maintenance services, and
international contracts. Institutions are mainly responsible for this di¢ culty
due to the problems related to third-party verication of the terms of the con-
1The rationale for honest behavior is referred to in di¤erent strands of the literature. For
instance, guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007)
or lying aversion (Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al., 2009) helps to explain honest behavior in
unenforceable economic transactions.
2See, for instance, the experimental work of Fehr et al. (1997), in which social preferences,
if able to be disclosed, produce e¢ ciency gains and increase the size and extent of trade.
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tract and the enforcement costs in courts (Boehm, 2013; Cappelen et al., 2014).
Reputation e¤ects have also been considered in the literature (MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1989; Klein and Murphy, 1997; Baker et al., 2002) as the main (and
possibly cheapest) way to solve the problem of contract enforceability without
incurring any legal/institutional costs.
Given this background, in this paper, we provide further insights into the
following issues. Legal institutions, especially courts of law, regulate property
rights and allow for legally binding contracts. However, as argued, these tasks
are carried out at a cost vis-à-vis a fully self-enforcing environment in which
individuals can costlessly execute market transactions exclusively on the basis
of trust. We therefore want to compare the impact on social welfare of an en-
forcing legal system in which individuals can choose between binding contracts,
which are enforceable at a cost, and non-binding contracts, which are only self-
enforceable, with that in a setting in which an enforcing legal system is absent
and individuals can only adopt non-binding contracts. The main research ques-
tions in this respect are the following. How much do we gain in terms of social
surplus when we introduce a legal system with its enforcement schemes so that
individuals can choose whether to use it or otherwise to adopt non-binding
contracts and rely on trust? What drives the choice, when possible, between
binding and non-binding contracts? What is the role of reputation when indi-
viduals face this choice? To answer these questions, rst we need to investigate
the equilibrium conditions of the choice between legally binding and costly con-
tracts and non-binding contracts in both one-shot and repeated games. Then,
we provide an estimate through numerical simulations of the e¢ ciency in terms
of social welfare achieved with respect to the putative rst-best contract of a
setting in which only non-binding (self-enforceable) contracts exist.3 Finally, we
3The adoption of mathematical software (Mathematica 8.0) allows for the composition of
often-complicated solutions to optimization problems, which could not otherwise have been
interpreted.
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estimate the e¢ ciency achieved when individuals are confronted with the choice
between binding and non-binding contracts.
Our main ndings are the following. A legal system protecting property
rights produces mainly benets. These benets can be measured carefully
through our numerical simulations given our assumptions. As expected, large
benets can be achieved when enforcement is not very costly in an untrust-
worthy environment. Important gains from trade can especially be achieved
in high-quality production, timely deliveries, etc. and in all circumstances in
which e¤ort productivity is important. In this case, widespread honesty is not a
su¢ cient enforcement device and, therefore, an enforcing legal system may be
socially desirable. However, a legal system can also be detrimental with respect
to a fully self-enforcing environment. This occurs for a subset of parameters, es-
pecially for standardized production. Finally, reputation has welfare-enhancing
properties when e¤ort is very valuable, whereas the benets are trivial for stan-
dardized production.
This paper relates to two important strands of theoretical literature: principal-
agent models and signaling theory. Consider a set-up with an enforcing legal
system. We propose a principal-agent model in which the two parties enter a
transaction in which the principal is the contract designer and has to decide
whether to propose a binding or a non-binding contract. The agent decides
whether to accept or reject the o¤er. If the agent rejects it, the game ends. If
the agent accepts it, then he provides the service required and waits for the prin-
cipal to pay the expected price for the service, which is observable at no cost.
We refer to a contract as binding when one of the two parties (the principal)
bears ex ante some costs that make the terms of the agreement legally veriable
in front of an impartial third party (e.g., a court of law), so that the princi-
pal has to honor the contract and pay the price whenever the observed service
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corresponds to that originally required. We refer to a contract as non-binding
when the terms of the contract remain unveriable and therefore unenforceable
or when ex post veriability is too costly and thus unavailable. Accordingly,
honesty, and consequently trust, will necessarily play a role. The principal de-
cides whether or not to fulll the agreement according to her type: an honest
principal will always fulll it, whereas a purely self-interested principal will not,
unless it is strategically convenient for her reputation.
In the modern principal-agent literature, emotional or social preferences have
assumed increasing relevance. In the binding contract, emotional or social pref-
erences cannot be disclosed due to the full completeness of the contract. On
the contrary, this type of preferences are relevant to the non-binding contract
due to its incomplete nature. In general, we can distinguish between one-sided
reciprocity, or one-sided giving, and two-sided reciprocity, or more simply reci-
procity. In one-sided giving, one party shares with another party without con-
sideration of the other partys sharing behavior, whereas reciprocal behavior is
generally the tendency to reciprocate kind acts with kindness and unkind acts
with spite.4 Our case can be assimilated to the rst category. Both principal
and agent can show emotional preferences, although agents cannot disclose their
emotional preferences because they cannot reciprocate the principals acts. The
set-up of the model implies that the agent simply fullls the required duty by
delivering exactly the required e¤ort once he enters the transaction.5 The prin-
cipal then decides whether to honor the contract according to his propensity
for honesty. In a way, the principal rewards the agents trust, not his pro-social
behavior, and more realistically the principal acts to adhere to social or moral
norms. The role of emotional behavior as a contract enforcement device has
4Regarding one-sided reciprocity, see Fehr et al. (1997); concerning two-sided reciprocity,
see Fehr and Schmidt (2007). For a comparison between one-sided and two-sided reciprocity,
see Malmendier et al. (2013).
5The principal can perfectly observe the agents e¤ort at no cost, so that the agent cannot
"cheat."
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been investigated theoretically and experimentally by many inuential econo-
mists.6 For the purpose of this paper, we are not interested in the driving forces
behind behaving fairly and honestly to fulll non-binding contracts. We simply
assume that a share of individuals precommit to behaving honestly, meaning
that they do not consider breaching an agreement as a feasible strategy.
The principals type is private information. Initially, signaling theory pro-
duced models with agents holding private information (for instance Spence,
1973). Later, several important papers, starting with Myerson (1983), reversed
the asymmetric information in favor of principals. Maskin and Tirole (1990) also
showed that an "informed principal" can easily be found in real market transac-
tions (e.g., franchising agreements). Cases may also occur in which a principal
has full bargaining power against an agent in the supply of goods or services,
such as outsourcing contracts in which a large rm exploits its contracting power
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a small rm, which is only required to
satisfy a participation constraint. In our informed principal set-up, the princi-
pals choice regarding the contract to propose can be interpreted as a signal of
the principals type, regardless of the nature of the transaction. It corresponds
to the intention to fulll or renege on a non-binding promise and conrms the
classical view in economics, initiated by the seminal paper by Crawford and
Sobel (1982), that non-binding contracts are nothing but cheap talk. Honest
principals would like to signal and separate themselves in equilibrium in order
to be "recognized" by the agent. However, contrary to many signaling games
(see for instance Cho and Kreps, 1987), whenever a non-binding contract is
proposed in equilibrium, the agent is not able to recognize the principals type
and, therefore, no separating equilibrium exists. This depends on the structure
of preferences that induces selsh principals always to mimic honest principals.
6Just to cite a few authors, see Akerlof (1982), Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Rabin (1993),
and Fehr et al. (1997). For an extensive overview of the topic, see Fehr and Schmidt (2003).
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A similar conclusion arises even when allowing parties to trade repeatedly.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the general
specication of the model. Sections 3 and 4 present the results for the one-
shot game and for the repeated game, respectively, when an enforcing legal
system allows for a choice between binding and non-binding contracts. Section
5 describes the welfare comparisons between the social optimum and various
types of decentralized solutions. Finally, Section 6 discusses the main results
and concludes the paper.
2 The model
In the following principal-agent model, a risk-neutral principal (P ) (she) asks a
risk-neutral agent (A) (he) to provide a service requiring a positive e¤ort level
(e) in exchange for a positive price (p). P makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (e; p)
to A, who decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er.7 If A rejects the o¤er,
the game ends; if A accepts the o¤er, he provides an e¤ort level ~e and waits for
P to pay the promised price. P observes ~e at no cost.8 Thus, no moral hazard
exists. P can choose between an unenforceable or non-binding (NB) contract
and a binding (B) contract. Potential punishment threats are not included in
the model as enforcement mechanisms.
The terms of an NB contract (eNB ; pNB) are not veriable and not enforce-
able by a court of law. Thus, in case of a breach of the contract, the law does not
provide a remedy because of the absence of an enforcing legal system tout court.
7As in Fehr et al. (1997), we consider a very competitive market of services supplied by
numerous agents. This allows principals to have strong bargaining power and o¤er contracts
with expected zero rents for the agents.
8The assumption of perfect observability of the agents e¤ort makes trust unilateral: the
agent has to decide whether or not the principal deserves trust. The perfect observability
of e¤ort can also be found in Gächter and Falk (2002), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
and Fehr and Schmidt (2007). When e¤ort is not perfectly observable, as in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1989), the principal can solicit the agents fairness to provide high e¤ort levels
through generous bonuses. In this case, trust becomes bilateral.
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We can also suppose that the contract is far too costly either to enforce ex post
in front of a court of law or to verify ex post by an independent third party.
Therefore, the NB contract can be considered as a gentlemens agreement in
which P promises pNB in exchange for eNB . If A accepts the agreement and
delivers the required e¤ort level (i.e., ~e = eNB), then P is free to fulll or renege
on her promise to pay the price pNB . In this context, A appeals to the honesty
of P to recompense the placed trust.
The terms of aB contract (eB ; pB) are veriable and enforceable by a court of
law, making it legally binding. Nevertheless, making the contract fully binding
ex ante has a cost, which is calculated as a fraction of the price, cpB , with
c 2 (0; 1). Thus, if A accepts a B contract and delivers the required e¤ort level
(i.e., ~e = eB), he can enforce the payment of pB . For example, consider the
following contractual pre-commitment. P deposits in advance pB to a third
party (e.g., a bank) with a written and fully veriable contract, in which, if A
fullls his duties by supplying eB , the third party is committed to making this
money readily available to A. This also justies the proportionality of the fee
with respect to the value of transaction pB .9 However, c may be interpreted in
many ways. An ine¢ cient legal system, which can also be caused by bad politics,
raises the costs of veriability and enforceability. We may expect that countries
with evolved legal systems with low transaction costs, reduced corruption, and
an e¢ cient judiciary can provide lower costs of veriability and enforceability.
We assume that P is randomly drawn from a population of individuals who
can be either honest (H) or selsh (S). S acts strategically and only cares about
her monetary utility, whereas H precommits to fullling the contract even if it is
unenforceable by third parties. The principals type is private information, but
the share of honest individuals,  2 (0; 1), is common knowledge. Therefore, this
model is characterized by a two-type, two-action signaling game in which P is
9Along these lines, cpB can also be seen in terms of the foregone interests.
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the sender and A the receiver: since the principals type is private information,
the contract proposal is a potential signal about her type. As it stands, the
distinction in the model between H and S arises only in the NB contracts.
Several explanations can be given for a principal being of the H-type. For
instance, H-type individuals can be guilt-averse if they do not live up to the
terms of the contract or do not follow some social norms of honesty.10 Thus, we
assume that breaking a promise or exploiting another persons trust implies a
considerable psychic cost (f) that induces the H-type individuals to fulll their
obligation (Gürtler, 2008). Concerning the agents, since e¤ort is observable at
no cost, no A can cheat on his e¤ort level; therefore, distinguishing between
honest and selsh agents is meaningless. Thus, to simplify the notation, H and
S will apply only to principals.
Regardless of the contract o¤ered, we assume that P , independently of her
type, never pays A if she observes ~e 6= eB ; eNB	. This can be justied using the
Roman words inadimplenti non est adimplendum, meaning that an individual is
not obliged to respect his or her obligation if the counterpart has not respected
his or her own.11
Ps revenue from As performance is described by the production function
y(e) = e , where  2 (0; 2) is exogenous and measures the marginal returns
to e¤ort.12 Its value is common knowledge. This is mainly a technological
parameter, but it can also be subjective. For example, suppose that your TV
is broken, your favorite program is about to start, and you call for a repair
service. If you have other TVs, your  can be relatively small, but if you have
10With regard to guilt aversion in promises, see Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), and Batti-
galli and Dufwenberg (2007). In relation to preferences including further moral considerations,
see Camerer (2003) and Konow (2003).
11Since e¤ort is perfectly observable, P does not need to appeal to the agents reciprocal
behavior. Therefore, contrary to Fehr et al. (2007), we exclude any additional reward or
bonus to be paid to the agent that di¤ers from the promised price.
12  2 would cause negative or innite utility to principals. If  < 1, the production
function shows decreasing returns to e¤ort; if  = 1, the returns are constant; and if  > 1,
the returns are increasing.
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only one TV, your  can be very high. In general,  is high when e¤ort is
very valuable, such as for goods/services with strict time delivery, high-quality
goods/services, and highly demanding markets with strong competitors and
discerning customers. On the contrary,  is low for standardized goods and in
all cases in which e¤ort is not very valuable. Finally, we assume that the agents
cost of providing a given e¤ort e follows a standard cost function k(e) = 12e
2.13
If an NB contract is o¤ered, the utility functions are as follows:
UNBP =

y(e)  pNB , ~e = eNB
y(e), ~e 6= eNB principals utility from fullling NB
UNBP =

y(e)  f , ~e = eNB
y(e), ~e 6= eNB principals utility from reneging on NB
UNBA =

(pNB   k(e)) + (1  )( k(e)), ~e = eNB
 k(e), ~e 6= eNB agents expected utility from NB.
For simplicity, we consider f = 0 if the principal is S-type, and f = 1 if
she is H-type.14 Thus, UNBP = U
NB
H = U
NB
S , whereas if ~e = e
NB , then UNBS =
y(eNB) and UNBH =  1.
If a B contract is o¤ered, the utility functions are as follows:
UBP =

y(e)  (1 + c)pB , ~e = eB
y(e)  cpB , ~e 6= eB principals utility from B
UBA =

pB   k(e), ~e = eB
 k(e), ~e 6= eB agents utility from B.
In sum, the timing of the game consists of three stages. In stage 1, P
observes her own type, and decides whether to o¤er a B or an NB contract
to A according to the levels of , , and c. In stage 2, A decides whether to
13For similar specications of the cost of e¤ort function, see Milgrom and Roberts (1992),
Schaefer (1998), Azar (2007), and Gürtler (2008), among others.
14As described by Sacconi and Grimalda (2007), individuals, such as the H-type principals
here, are not motivated necessarily by the personal value attached to the outcomes of their
actions, but rather by the fact that these actions satisfy some social norms.
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accept or reject the o¤er. If A rejects the o¤er, the game ends and both players
obtain zero; otherwise, A decides on the e¤ort level to provide and waits for the
payment. In stage 3, if the contract is binding and ~e = eB , P pays pB , whereas,
if the contract is non-binding and ~e = eNB , P decides whether or not to pay
pNB according to her type.
Players are matched randomly and interact only once in a one-shot game.
Below, this hypothesis will be relaxed to allow for nitely repeated interactions.
We solve both games by searching for perfect Bayesian equilibria. The following
proposition introduces some equilibrium properties that hold in both games.
Proposition 1 (a) Rejecting the principals o¤er (~e = 0) strictly dominates
the delivery of an e¤ort level ~e 6= eB ; eNB	.
(b) No separating equilibrium exists.
(c) Deviating to an NB contract is never protable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (a) implies that A either delivers the requested e¤ort or does not accept
the o¤er. For instance, providing levels of e¤ort that are higher than eB or
eNB - in accordance with the contract accepted - is simply not rewarding for A,
because no P experiences a positive psychological impact that would reciprocate
this behavior. As mentioned above, the H-type behavior is intended only in
terms of fullling the promise and no incentive e¤ect will occur as in (two-
sided) reciprocity models. Part (b) implies that only pooling equilibria can
exist. O¤ering an NB contract is more convenient to S than to H, since S
will not pay the price and will not experience any psychological cost in reneging
on the promise. Thus, whenever H prefers to o¤er an NB contract, S has the
same incentive and must mimic H to make A accept the o¤er. Finally, part (c)
implies that to prove the existence of a given equilibrium it is su¢ cient to prove
that the parties cannot protably deviate to any B contract.
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3 One-shot game
Proposition 2 In a one-shot game, there exists an equilibrium in which P
o¤ers a B contract, which A accepts. This is a unique equilibrium if    =
1
1+c , whereas, if  > , there also exists a class of equilibria in which both H
and S o¤er an NB contract that A accepts.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results predict that an NB contract may arise in equilibrium as the
probability  of facing an honest principal increases and/or the enforcement
costs c increase.15 In this case, multiple equilibria arise in NB contracts, with
A always obtaining zero and P obtaining positive payo¤s. Unfortunately, we
cannot reduce the number of equilibria by applying standard renements, such
as the Intuitive Criterion or the Divinity Criterion, because for any given equi-
librium, A cannot exclude that a deviation to another equilibrium comes from
one type of principal only.16 Both H-type and S-type principals share the same
preferences for the agents beliefs (i.e., while trading, both types prefer A to
believe that he is trading with an H-type) and for the equilibrium contracts.
This implies that when one type strictly prefers one equilibrium to another, the
other type holds the same order of preferences. As a consequence, given two
equilibria in the class of NB contracts, NB1 and NB2, if H has an incentive
to deviate from NB1 to NB2, the same must hold for S. The same reasoning
applies to any deviation from equilibria in B contracts to equilibria in NB con-
tracts. In other words, whatever signal H sends, S always has an incentive to
mimic and exploit the asymmetric information. The problem of multiple pool-
ing equilibria is, however, of little relevance: since P chooses which contract to
15Similar results can be found in Berg et al. (1995), Fehr et al. (1997), and Fehr and
Schmidt (2003).
16See Cho and Kreps (1987) for the Intuitive Criterion and Banks and Sobel (1987) for the
Divinity Criterion.
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propose, it is plausible that she will choose the maximizing contract. Hence, in
the subsequent analysis, it will turn out to be reasonable as well as useful to
consider exclusively the principals prot-maximizing equilibrium. This helps
to solve the repeated game with no loss of generality and does not a¤ect the
results for the subsequent welfare analysis.
4 Repeated game
Suppose the game is played repeatedly in a xed matching for a nite number
of periods T , in which the value is common knowledge. The discount factor is
assumed to be equal to 1.17 In each period, P decides whether to propose an
NB or a B contract to A. If P proposes an NB contract and breaches it in
period t(< T ), then A infers that she is an S-type, and he will therefore refuse
any NB contract from this principal in the future, only accepting B contracts.
Nevertheless, S may have the incentive to acquire strategic reputation for future
transactions and consequently fulll non-binding contracts. Thus, we observe
that in a one-shot game, A bases his beliefs, and therefore decides how much
trust to place in his counterpart, exclusively on the share of honest individuals
(i.e., ). In the repeated game, A bases his beliefs on  and on the incentive
for S to engage in reputation building.18 S can acquire two levels of reputation.
One level of reputation is such that S proposes and fullls an NB contract,
that is, S does not have an incentive to deviate to breaching the contract. This
reputation is enough to sustain NB contracts and avoid the punishment for
breaching, but it is not enough to a¤ect As beliefs. Thus, although A trusts
any P proposing an NB contract, the contract is second-best and we can refer
to it as a second-best reputation. A rst-best reputation is such that S proposes
17Gürtler (2008), in a similar setting, considers a discount factor varying between 0 and 1.
18Of course, As beliefs are also updated according to the history of the transactions.
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and fullls a rst-best (FB) contract as if the agentsbeliefs are such that  = 1,
that is as if A were to meet an H-type principal and no breach of the contract
occurs.19 If an FB contract is proposed in equilibrium, this must maximize
Ps utility.20 Accordingly, in an FB equilibrium the utility functions are the
following:
UFBP = U
FB
S = U
FB
H = 

2 

1  
2

and UFBA = 0.
Breaking the FB contract, which arises only o¤ the equilibrium path, would
yield the following utilities:
UFBS = 

2  , UFBH =  1 and UFBA < 0.
Consider the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (a) S always breaks any promise in the last period T .
(b) If a B contract is chosen in equilibrium in the periods t + 1; :::; T , then
S always breaks any promise in period t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma implies that A considers the last period T or the period before
applying the B contract as a one-shot game. In particular, part (a) implies
that no equilibrium exists, in which the FB contract is o¤ered in period T .
Consequently, in period T only NB or B contracts can be o¤ered, with S
breaching the NB contract as in the one-shot game. Part (b) implies that no
equilibrium exists in which the FB contract is o¤ered in periods 1; :::; t and a
19Seen di¤erently but achieving the same result is the case in which no enforcement costs
could occur (i.e., c = 0).
20Suppose that a non-maximizing FB contract is proposed in equilibrium in a certain period
t < T . A is sure to be paid because any P would fulll the contract. Nevertheless, P can
protably deviate to o¤ering the prot-maximizing FB contract, which A would be willing to
accept.
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B contract is o¤ered thereafter. This marks an important di¤erence from the
NB contract. The FB contract can be o¤ered and accepted only if A is sure
about its fulllment.
Proposition 3 In a repeated game,
(a) There is an equilibrium in which the B contract applies in each period,
and it is unique if   .
(b) If  >  =
"

2+(T 1)( 11+c )

2  (1  2 )
(T 2)(1  2 )+1
# 2 

, there also exist T   1 classes
of equilibria, in which the FB contract applies in the periods 1; :::; t, with t 
T   1, and an NB contract thereafter, which S always honors except in period
T .
(c) If  <   , there also exists a class of equilibria, in which an NB
contract applies in each period, which S always honors except in period T .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equilibrium multiplicity also a¤ects repeated games, as highlighted by Fu-
denberg and Maskin (1986). Multiple equilibria cannot be reduced by using
standard renements, but as in the one-shot game, it is plausible to assume
prot-maximizing principals and sketch some general considerations about the
e¤ects of reputation on partiesbehavior and welfare.
As in the one-shot game, 8 < 1=2 and 8c 2 (0; 1), the equilibrium is a B
contract in each period. This shows that reputation is not enough to ll the
lack of trust generated by low levels of . In other words, a threshold level of 
exists below which reputation cannot induce the adoption of NB contracts. In
our model, this threshold requires at least the majority of players to be honest
(i.e., ), and it depends on the enforcement costs existing in the legal system
and for that specic transaction.
Proposition 3 implies a result that is coherent with the reputational e¤ects
provided by repeated interactions: the FB contract can be implemented even
14
if  < 1. As mentioned above, in repeated games, As trust in the counterpart
depends on  and on the incentive for S to acquire strategic reputation for future
transactions. If this incentive is very strong, strategic reputation can trigger FB
contracts. The incentive to acquire a rst-best reputation is higher the lower are
the gains from reneging on FB contracts, and as the repeated games approach
the nal period T , this incentive decreases and only a second-best reputation can
be spent in front of A. The rst-best reputation depends on the main variables
at stake. It is easy to check their impact on  and t.21 In particular, as
the share of honest individuals decreases, FB contracts become less sustainable
over time and give way to NB contracts (@t

@ > 0,
@
@ = 0). Eventually, the
strategic reputation may not be su¢ cient to ll the lack of trust generated by
low levels of honesty (i.e.,   ) to make informal agreements work. Increasing
enforcement costs reduce the convenience of o¤ering B contracts. This induces
S-type principals to invest more in reputation (@t

@c > 0,
@
@c < 0). Interestingly,
if honesty is not widespread or the legal system is particularly e¢ cient (by
keeping c at low levels) such that   , the strategic reputation plays no role
because only B contracts would be used. Ceteris paribus, honesty feeds strategic
reputation, but there must be su¢ cient honest individuals in the population
(such that  > ) to release the positive e¤ects of the strategic reputation on
the trust levels.
The variable , measuring the marginal returns to e¤ort, also has an impact
on reputation (@t

@ < 0,
@
@ > 0). As  increases, second-best non-binding con-
21Consider the lower endpoint of condition (9) in the proof of Proposition 3 and solve for
t; we nd that:
t < T   
2  
1  

2 


2   

1
1+c
 
2 
.
The rst partial derivative of the right-hand side in the above inequality, within the interval
of denition  > , is positive in  and c, and negative in . Further, as ! 1, t tends to
reach its maximum, that is, T   1.
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tracts expand at the expense of FB contracts.22 On the contrary, as  decreases,
a rst-best reputation is more easily sustainable. This result can be interpreted
in the following way. High levels of  refer to production functions in which
e¤ort is very valuable, for example, in terms of quality of production, timely
delivery, etc. The required e¤ort is, therefore, very high and so is its remunera-
tion. This situation increases the incentive for S to break the FB contract due
to the increasing gains to be achieved from reneging (i.e., @(U
FB
S  UFBS )
@ > 0).
However, an increasing share of honest individuals in the society can contrast
this negative e¤ect. Thus, honesty becomes crucial to trigger high e¤ort levels
when e¤ort is very valuable.
As regards the number of interactions T , its increase implies a higher t,
which, as it stands, is not especially informative. Nevertheless, since @(
t(T )
T )
@T >
0, as T increases, the number of FB contracts increases more than the number
of NB contracts for a given triple (; ; c). Further, consider that @@T < 0.
Thus, as expected and as suggested by some inuential literature (Gächter and
Falk 2002, Brown et al. 2004), the more numerous the transactions, the more
reputation will be acquired.
Finally, when P fullls the NB contract, A raises a positive payo¤. This is
the cost for H-type principals of pooling equilibria, or read di¤erently, the cost
of the lack of good signals (see Proposition 1(b)). As a consequence, the agents
expected utility increases as t decreases and reaches its highest level in the
equilibrium in which the NB contract applies each period. When information
on individuals type is rather uncertain, that is, when  is neither close to 0
(i.e., an untrustworthy P ) nor close to 1 (i.e., a trustworthy P ) the benets of
a second-best reputation are partly diverted to the agents. In this case, the less
informed party receives a benet from uncertainty, which is paid in total by the
more informed party, who needs to acquire reputation in repeated games.
22Nevertheless,  must be at least higher than 1/2 to implement non-binding agreements.
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5 Welfare analysis
In this section, we compare the welfare achieved by the private solution aris-
ing from a decentralized choice with that of the public solution, in which the
production is centralized and all the players follow the instructions of a central
planner. We proceed in the following way. First, we assess the environment in
which a one-shot transaction relies exclusively on the trust level existing in a
society, in which an enforcing legal system does not exist and only NB con-
tracts can be applied. Second, we introduce a legal system with its enforcement
schemes so that individuals have the choice of whether to use it or otherwise
rely on trust, as described in the previous sections through the choice between
costly B contracts and NB contracts. Third, we add the repeated interactions,
as shown in section 4, to assess the impact of strategic reputation on the levels
of welfare.
The optimal public solution identies the rst-best social surplus that is
achievable as if no enforcement cost and no asymmetric information could occur,
whereby a social planner can impose the e¢ cient e¤ort level. The public solution
corresponds to what we referred to in the previous section as an FB contract.
We call W the welfare function identifying the social surplus. The rst-best
social surplus is:
WFB = 

2 

2 
2

.23
This is the maximum achievable social surplus for any given .
5.1 No enforcing legal system
Consider a transaction in which no legal system exists or is able to enforce the
terms of the exchange. What we presented as an NB contract mirrors this
23The result follows from maxe

e   1
2
e2
	
. Note that @WFB
@
> 0 if  > 1.
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situation exactly. The welfare function for NB contracts yields the following
social surplus:
WNB = ()

2 

2 
2

,24
wherein WNB is calculated in the prot-maximizing equilibrium.25
In the following, we measure the e¢ ciency levels () achievable under a
decentralized solution in terms of the distance between its social surplus and the
rst-best social surplus. Therefore, WNB will be compared in percentage terms
with WFB . The comparison will be evaluated over the space  =]0; 1[]0; 2[
with each variable uniformly distributed. Trivially,  crucially depends on the
values of  and , as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. E¢ ciency levels in the absence of an enforcing legal system.
We nd that the overall e¢ ciency level in the absence of an enforcing legal
system, calculated for the entire domain of the plane (; ), is:
NB = 100 
1Z
=0
2Z
=0
1
2
WNB
WFB
dd = 61:37%.
24Note that @WNB
@
> 0, and @WNB
@
> 0 if  > b() > 1 with  > 1=2.
25Since A obtains zero in the NB equilibria predicted in Propositions 2 and 3, it emerges
that WNB , which is calculated in the prot-maximizing equilibrium, is the highest social
surplus achievable when an NB contract is o¤ered.
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This value implies that self-enforcing transactions waste, on average, slightly
less than 40% of the surplus with respect to a putative equilibrium in rst-best.
In Figure 1, the overall e¢ ciency level corresponds to the volume of the surface
in the cuboid. We can also compute NB for given levels of  in the entire
domain of . Figure 2 presents the e¢ ciency levels of WNB conditioned for
 = f0:1; 0:5; 0:9g, corresponding to the sections of the surface in Figure 1.
a.  = 0:1 b.  = 0:5 c.  = 0:9
Figure 2. E¢ ciency levels in the absence of an enforcing legal system for given levels of .
We observe that, independently of the values of , the loss in e¢ ciency
increases in , but is compensated for by the positive impact of high levels of
. The visual impression of the gures above can be translated into numerical
terms in the following table, which presents the e¢ ciency function conditioned
for both  and .

0:1 1:0 1:9
0:1 92.78 19.00 0
 0:5 98.95 75.00 0.002
0:9 99.97 99.00 39.17
Table 1. E¢ ciency levels (%) in the absence of an enforcing legal system.
Low levels of  (i.e., 0:1) allow for high levels of e¢ ciency, even in the pres-
ence of low levels of , whereas, high levels of  (i.e., 1:9) reduce e¢ ciency even
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in the presence of high values of . This means that self-enforcing transactions
are not generally able to achieve high e¢ ciency levels in the presence of increas-
ing marginal returns to e¤ort. In other words, when e¤ort is highly valuable,
a centralized solution considerably reduces the distortions occurring in incom-
plete contracting. As e¤ort shows diminishing marginal returns, as we normally
expect in common production functions, the private solution approaches the
public solution.
5.2 One-shot game
As expected, the absence of a legal system, in which only unenforceable trans-
actions can be clinched, generally yields serious ine¢ ciencies for low levels of
trust (i.e., low ). These ine¢ ciencies are, however, attenuated for transactions
in which e¤ort is not valuable. In particular, if  is low, such as in standardized
production, an enforcing legal system may not be very useful. For high levels of
, such as in high-quality production, timely deliveries, etc., an enforcing legal
system may be socially desirable.
Consider the hypothetical introduction of an enforcing legal system, pro-
tecting property rights and allowing for veriable and enforceable contracts. In
these circumstances, individuals can decide whether to apply a B or an NB
contract, as in sections 2 to 4. Assume that this option refers to a one-shot
transaction. From proposition 2, the prot-maximizing equilibrium in the one-
shot game (OS) contemplates the adoption of a B contract if    and an
NB contract if  > . Accordingly, the welfare function of the one-shot game,
WOS , is the following
WOS =
WNB if  > 
WB if   
, where WB =


1+c
 
2 

2 
2

.
First, we know that the choice between B contracts and NB contracts does
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not depend on . This implies that for each couple of values (; c), the e¢ ciency
levels are evaluated for the entire domain of  either in a B contract or in an
NB contract, depending on the choice made in the OS setting. The overall
e¢ ciency level of the OS setting is:
OS = 100 
1Z
=0
1Z
c=0
2Z
=0
1
2
WOS
WFB
ddcd = 70:27%.
This is a striking result if compared with NB , because it shows that in-
troducing an enforcing legal system and, therefore, widening the contractual
choice over transactions improves the overall e¢ ciency by about 9 percentage
points with respect to a transaction system that is exclusively based on trust.26
Nonetheless, the one-shot game wastes on average slightly less than 30% of the
potential social surplus achievable with a public solution.
Consider OS for specic values of , c, and , as shown in Table 2.

case  = 0:1 case  = 1 case  = 1:9
0:1 0:5 0:9 0:1 0:5 0:9 0:1 0:5 0:9
0:1 99.50 99.50 99.50 90.91 90.91 90.91 16.35 16.35 16.35
c 0:5 97.89 97.89 99.97 66.67 66.67 99.00 0.05 0.05 39.17
0:9 96.68 96.68 99.97 52.63 52.63 99.00 0.001 0.001 39.17
Table 2. Punctual e¢ ciency levels (%) of one-shot game equilibria for =f0:1;1:0;1:9g.
In Table 2, the NB contract is chosen, regardless of , for  = 0:9 and
c = f0:5; 0:9g, and the B contract is chosen otherwise. Even if  does not play
any role in the contractual choice, the level of  plays a role in the e¢ ciency
levels achieved by the chosen contract. For  = 0:1, the e¢ ciency is particularly
high and close to 100% for any combination of (; c). For  = 1, the e¢ ciency is
26To our knowledge, this is the rst time that the benets of the legal system are evaluated
in terms of its e¢ ciency.
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still high and greater than 90%, for either low levels of c or high levels of , and
it signicantly decreases otherwise. Finally, for  = 1:9, the e¢ ciency collapses
to values very close to 0; a reduction in c and/or an increase in  lessens this
negative e¤ect.
In more detail, by comparing Table 1 and Table 2 it is easy to check that
the region where the B contract is chosen can be split into two further regions:
one where the choice of the B contract is welfare-improving with respect to the
NB contract and another where the NB contract outperforms the B contract
in terms of social surplus (and thus in terms of e¢ ciency), although the NB
contract is not eventually chosen. In Table 2, the rst region includes the cases
of  = 0:1, regardless of c and ; the cases of  = 0:5 and c = 0:1, regardless
of ; and the case  = 0:5, c = 0:5,  = 1:9. The second region includes the
remaining cases to which the NB contract does not apply. The following lemma
denes the second region more rigorously.
Lemma 2 If  >  then WOS(= WNB)  WB. If    then there exist
^ = (c) > 0 and ^ = (; c) > 0 such that WOS(= WB) < WNB for  > ^
and   ^.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As seen above, in terms of e¢ ciency, the gains from the rst region are
higher overall than the loss from the second region. The gure below depicts
the second region, which is actually a surface.
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Figure 3. Surface with welfare-improving NB contracts as B contracts are chosen.
Lemma 2 and Figure 3 show that the region becomes smaller as  grows.
We can conclude that, in a one-shot game, the introduction of an enforcing
legal system, and the consequent freedom regarding which contract to choose,
is detrimental to the social surplus for a level of  beyond a certain threshold,
but below , and especially for diminishing marginal returns to e¤ort. On the
contrary, the choice of binding agreements helps to improve the e¢ ciency as
the enforcement costs are kept low and honest behavior is not widespread. In
addition, for high levels of , a self-enforcing system of trade is highly inef-
cient, and the opportunity to appeal to a formal and protected exchange is
welfare-improving and becomes socially desirable, especially if enforcement is
not particularly costly.
5.3 Repeated game
In this section, we want to understand whether or not strategic reputation
a¤ects e¢ ciency. The overall e¢ ciency level of the multiple equilibria in the
space (   c T ) in repeated games, RG, is described by the ratio of their
welfare function (WRG), comprising the sum of the social surpluses achieved in
each period, and the welfare function of the equilibria in which parties would
trade with FB contracts in every period (WRFB):
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RG = 100 
1Z
=0
1Z
c=0
2Z
=0
1
2
WRG
WRFB
=
8>>>><>>>>:
70:71% if T = 10
71:86% if T = 100
72:98% if T = 1000
9>>>>=>>>>;.
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From the numerical simulations, we can appreciate a certain increase in the
overall e¢ ciency levels with respect to one-shot games. This is due to the trans-
actions occurring with FB contracts if  >  (see Proposition 3). As expected,
as T increases, the e¢ ciency increases accordingly. We have shown above that,
for a given triple (; ; c) as  > , an increase in T brings about a relatively
larger number of FB contracts with respect to NB contracts, which increases
the average social surplus and, consequently, the overall e¢ ciency levels of the
repeated-game setting. Nevertheless, the increase in overall e¢ ciency does not
seem to be very sensitive to an increase in T : the interactions must become very
large (e.g., from 10 to 1000) to achieve an increase in overall e¢ ciency of about
2 percentage points.
Table 3 presents the e¢ ciency levels. Note that changes in T can a¤ect the
e¢ ciency levels only for the cases of  = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g, regardless of ;
that is, for  > , where NB and FB contracts apply. In all other cases, the
e¢ ciency levels do not change and are equal to those calculated for the one-shot
setting. For these reasons, the table below displays the changes in T only for
 = 0:9 to appreciate the changes in the e¢ ciency levels.
27WRG is calculated by assuming that principals maximize their utility when proposing an
NB contract in some periods as  > . Therefore, WRG corresponds to the maximum social
surplus achievable when an NB contract is chosen in one or more periods.
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0:1 0:5 0:9
T=10 T=100 T=1000
0:1 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50
case  = 0:1 c 0:5 97.89 97.89 99.997 99.9997 100
0:9 96.68 96.68 99.997 99.9997 100
0:1 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91 90.91
case  = 1 c 0:5 66.67 66.67 99.90 99.99 99.999
0:9 52.63 52.63 99.90 99.99 99.999
0:1 16.35 16.35 16.35 16.35 16.35
case  = 1:9 c 0:5 0.05 0.05 39.17 39.17 92.52
0:9 0.001 0.001 39.17 39.17 92.58
Table 3. Punctual e¢ ciency levels (%) of repeated-game equilibria for =f0:1;1:0;1:9g.
In more detail, the table above highlights that the main e¢ ciency gains with
respect to the one-shot setting arise for increasing marginal returns to e¤ort
(i.e.,  = 1:9) and when non-binding agreements are clinched (i.e.,  = 0:9
and c = f0:5; 0:9g). This is due to the positive e¤ects of reputation on trust,
which allow the implementation of FB contracts. Consider the following triple
( = 0:9;  = 1:9; c = 0:5): the di¤erence in e¢ ciency levels between T = 1; 000
and T = 100 is substantial (i.e., from 39.17% to 92.52%). Nevertheless, with
the same triple, no di¤erence is seen between T = 100 and T = 10. This
means that the number of interactions may not be high enough to implement
equilibria with some FB contracts during the rst interactions (as predicted by
Proposition 3). For a low number of interactions, the incentive for S to break
FB contracts is high because the "time span" is not long enough. The agents
would then only accept NB contracts until the end of the games, because they
do not put enough trust in the incentive for S to acquire reputation. In other
words, a rst-best reputation can be acquired and trust can be granted only if
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T exceeds a certain threshold, otherwise it is not sustainable and, consequently,
it does not play any role.
In sum, without repeated interactions, the gains from trade may remain
largely unexploited for all forms of production in which e¤ort is very valuable
(i.e., high ), such as high-quality goods/services, goods/services for which the
time delivery is of extreme importance, and in general all goods/services in
which the agents e¤ort can make the di¤erence with respect to the principals
competitors or the customerssatisfaction. The introduction of repeated inter-
actions in the production of these goods and services can trigger reputational
mechanisms that ll the e¢ ciency gap and increase the social surplus. However,
these gains can be obtained only when informal agreements are normally cho-
sen (i.e.,  = 0:9 and c = f0:5; 0:9g) and only if the transactions are repeated
a certain number of times such that a "strong" (rst-best) reputation can be
acquired. In all other cases in which e¤ort is very valuable, the legal system
induces individuals to apply B contracts; consequently, the positive e¤ects that
reputation can produce do not come to light. Finally, reputation is not partic-
ularly valuable - regardless of the contract chosen - in standardized production
and in all kinds of production in which increasing levels of e¤ort do not provide
large gains.
6 Discussion and conclusion
We have used a simple model to examine the choice between binding and non-
binding contracts by two types of informed principals, one who is honest and
fullls her non-binding promises and another one who acts on purely selsh
grounds and may renege on her promises if convenient. We have also assessed
the welfare implications for parties transactions when an enforcing legal sys-
tem is introduced and allows for binding contracts, which are veriable and
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enforceable at a cost. The choice between these two types of contracts in equi-
librium depends on two variables: the enforcement costs and the widespread
honesty level. In particular, the worse the legal institutions, the more likely
are gentlemens agreements among the parties. This holds in both a one-shot
game and a nitely repeated game, independently of the number of interactions,
meaning that reputation does not a¤ect the choice of contract to implement. A
third variable, measuring the marginal returns to e¤ort, does not inuence this
choice.
In repeated games, a principal can acquire two levels of reputation. The
rst is a "rst-best" reputation, whereby the agent fully trusts the principal to
fulll what we called a rst-best contract. In this case, the agents trust is equal
to certainty, and this is incorporated into a non-binding contract that requires
higher e¤ort levels than any other non-binding contracts. The second level is
a "second-best" reputation, whereby the agent trusts the principal to fulll a
non-binding contract. Nevertheless, the levels of trust are not su¢ cient to allow
the principal to incorporate certainty fully into a non-binding contract. The
selsh principal would still be tempted to breach a rst-best contract.
Of course, reputation works only if non-binding contracts are implemented,
that is, only for high shares of honest individuals and/or high enforcement costs.
In these circumstances, we nd that when e¤ort is highly valuable, for example,
in terms of quality of production, timely delivery, etc., the selsh principal
cannot acquire a rst-best reputation due to the high gains to be achieved
from reneging. On the contrary, if e¤ort is not particularly valuable, such as
in standardized production, petty trade, or traditional agricultural contracts, a
rst-best reputation can more easily be established. Thus, reputation cannot
sustain very valuable contracts and only an increasing share of honest individuals
in the society can contrast this negative e¤ect.
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This model has been scrutinized in terms of the achievable e¢ ciency lev-
els. Through numerical simulations, we have accurately estimated the overall
e¢ ciency level (i.e., in the entire range of the variables) of the non-binding
contracts as if no legal system could enforce the terms of a contract and only
self-enforcing agreements can take place by relying exclusively on the share of
honest individuals existing in a society. Trading without an enforcing legal sys-
tem wastes roughly less than 40% of all the social surplus that a social planner
could otherwise achieve by coordinating the transactions. Self-enforcing trans-
actions generally achieve rather low e¢ ciency levels in the presence of increasing
marginal returns to e¤ort. As e¤ort shows diminishing marginal returns, as we
normally expect in a large part of production functions, the private solution
approaches the public solution.
Interestingly, once a legal system protecting property rights is introduced,
and consequently, once individuals can choose between legally binding contracts
and informal non-binding contracts, then the overall e¢ ciency level increases by
about nine percentage points. The gains occur mainly with low shares of honest
individuals, low enforcement costs, and especially when e¤ort is highly valuable.
In these circumstances, an enforcing legal system may be socially desirable.
However, this is not always the case when the shares of honest individuals and
the levels of enforcement costs are neither too high nor too low. In this case,
an enforcing legal system can be a welfare-reducing institution since, from a
social viewpoint, an informal agreement would have performed better but it
is not eventually chosen. This problem is more signicant when e¤ort is not
particularly valuable.
If the interaction is repeated a nite number of times, reputational e¤ects
may come into play. Of course, reputation can play a role only if individuals
honesty or strategic behavior can be disclosed, as in the non-binding agree-
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ments. We nd that the most considerable gains in terms of e¢ ciency arise
for increasing marginal returns to e¤ort, but only if the game is repeated a
su¢ cient number of times to trigger a rst-best reputation that can be spent
for a long period. Thus, reputation can be a very important welfare-enhancing
factor in the production of goods or services with strict timely delivery sched-
ules, goods or services providing high standards, and, in general, all goods or
services for which e¤ort is critical with respect to competition or customers
satisfaction. When repeated interactions occur, the enforcing legal system sac-
rices the welfare-enhancing role of reputation, especially in the production of
these goods and services when a binding form of agreement is usually chosen.
Finally, in the circumstances in which the production of goods or services does
not rely heavily on e¤ort productivity, repeated interactions do not generate
large e¢ ciency gains because the e¢ ciency levels are already substantial both
with and without an enforcing legal system.
These results may re-open an old debate regarding whether or not a cen-
tralized public solution has to be preferred to free exchange to maximize the
social surplus. The generally accepted solution of public intervention suggests
that the social planner should intervene with regulatory practices when private
contracting cannot assure an e¢ cient outcome. In our model, this case arises
in the presence of increasing marginal returns to e¤ort. However, for long-term
interactions and with a widespread trustworthy contractual environment, rep-
utation is ceteris paribus a good substitute for regulatory practices to increase
social surplus. Therefore, if e¤ort is particularly valuable, a social planner might
only intervene by reducing the enforcement costs and/or by strengthening indi-
vidualssense of honesty, if lacking. On the contrary, if e¤ort is not valuable,
the parties should be left to trade freely, because the e¢ ciency gains are already
largely exploited.
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The model that we present can be subject to further developments. The
introduction of imperfect observability of e¤ort would incorporate the issues re-
lated to two-sided reciprocity; consequently, di¤erent types of agents would then
matter. Another possible extension could allow for a continuum of individual
types, beyond the honest vs. selsh ones, as assumed above. Types can di¤er
according to the psychological impact of their dishonest/honest behavior. For
instance, individualsutility can capture the extent of honest behavior, which
may be considered limited in monetary terms, describing a sort of limitation to
human generosity. Therefore, individuals can renege on their promise or fulll it
according to the value of the transaction. Usually, promises referring to transac-
tions of very modest value are fullled, whereas the risk of reneging may increase
as the value grows. Hence, taking into account the degree of honesty would be
challenging, to evaluate how crucial the role of honesty and its intensity are for
the contractual choice and e¢ ciency levels.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Since P can observe ~e at no cost, providing
~e <

eB ; eNB
	
will immediately imply an infringement of the contract. We
assumed that independently of the type of P and the type of contract, P never
pays A as a consequence of the infringement. Providing ~e >

eB ; eNB
	
does
not entail any additional reward, thereby implying only an increase in k(e). As
a result, the best strategies for A are either rejecting the contract (i.e., ~e = 0) or
providing exactly the level of e¤ort requested according to the type of contract
(i.e., ~e =

eB ; eNB
	
).
(b) In a separating equilibrium, A would be able to infer Ps type by the
signal (viz. the contract) she sends. Suppose a separating equilibrium exists
such that H o¤ers an NB contract and S o¤ers a B contract. The following
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condition should hold:
UNBH  UBP  UNBS . (1)
Transitivity implies that UNBH = y(e
NB)   pNB  y(eNB) = UNBS . By as-
sumption, however, pNB > 0, thus, UNBH < U
NB
S , which contradicts condition
1. Thus, S would protably deviate from a B contract by proposing an NB
contract. Now suppose that a separating equilibrium exists such that H o¤ers
a B contract and S o¤ers an NB contract. A knows that S never fullls the
promise, so he will reject any o¤er of an NB contract. Thus, S would protably
o¤er a B contract. The same reasoning excludes any separating equilibrium for
the two types of principal o¤ering an NB contract with di¤erent levels of price
and/or e¤ort.
Suppose that H proposes an NB contract by paying an installment pNB
with  2 (0; 1) before that A supplies the required e¤ort, in order to signal
her type and discourage S to propose an NB contract. H will eventually pay
the price promised, whereas S would lose the installment if she wants to sig-
nal to be a H-type. Therefore, the signal is credible if it is su¢ ciently high to
discourage S from proposing an NB contract in equilibrium and paying the in-
stallment. Assume that A will provide the e¤ort requested after having received
the installment; the following condition must hold:
y(eNB)  pNB > y(eB)  (1 + c)pB > y(eNB)  pNB . (2)
This condition never holds 8  < 1.
(c) In general, consider a game between two players where one has private
information. An equilibrium exists if the player with private information has no
protable deviation, whatever the beliefs the other player can hold about that
deviation. In our case, consider a pooling equilibrium in which both types of P
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o¤er a given contract, but one or both types deviate to anNB contract. A has to
form some beliefs about such a deviation. Suppose A believes that the deviation
comes from an H-type principal, so that A would accept the proposal as long
as his expected utility is non-negative. However, this out-of-equilibrium belief
is inconsistent because S would always deviate to an NB contract in order to
exploit As beliefs. Thus, As beliefs that a deviation to an NB contract would
come from S must be strictly positive. In addition, the deviating principal
can not exclude that A holds adverse beliefs that such a deviation comes from
S, then A would reject the deviating contract. This excludes any protable
deviation to any o¤-equilibrium NB contracts.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an equilibrium where both types of P o¤er
a B contract. A will accept a B contract (pB ; eB) if it satises his participation
constraint:
p  1
2
e2. (3)
P has full bargaining power, thus she can satisfy the agents participation con-
straint as an equality without loss of generality. Substituting (3) holding as an
equality into the principals utility function, UBP , and maximizing with respect
to e, we obtain eB and pB , such that:
eB =


1 + c
 1
2 
pB =
1
2


1 + c
 2
2 
.
Both eB and pB are increasing in  and decreasing in c. A principal o¤ering a
B contract will therefore obtain:
UBP =


1 + c
 
2 

1  
2

.
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This equilibrium exists because (i) Proposition 1(c) proves that deviating to an
NB contract is never protable, and (ii) P cannot protably deviate to any
other B contract because she would get a lower payo¤. Thus, the B contract at
equilibrium is always prot-maximizing. Note that 8c 2 (0; 1) and 8 2 (0; 2),
UBP > 0. In addition, U
B
P is always decreasing in c, whereas it is increasing in 
only if   (c), with (c) > 1.
Consider now an equilibrium where both types of P o¤er an NB contract.
As expected utility will be:
UNBA = 

p  1
2
e2

+ (1  )

 1
2
e2

.
Thus, A will accept the o¤er if and only if:
p  1
2
e2. (4)
This participation constraint holds as an equality without loss of generality.
Since UNBH = e
   12e2 < e = UNBS , if H has no incentive to deviate to a B
contract, then it must also be true for S. Therefore, we can exclude that such
a deviation is protable if:
UNBH = e
   1
2
e2 >


1 + c
 
2 

1  
2

= UBP . (5)
Thus, any couple (e; p(e)) satisfying condition (5) is an equilibrium because
Proposition 1(c) excludes any deviation to another NB contract. To prove that
this class of equilibria (e; p(e)) in NB contracts is non-empty, we maximize UNBH
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with respect to e. We obtain:
eNB = ()
1
2 
pNB =
1
2


2  
2
2  .
Note that both eNB and pNB are always increasing at an increasing rate in ,
and if   1=2, also increasing in .28 The H-type principal will then obtain:
UNBH = ()

2 

1  
2

, (6)
which is always increasing in ; and in  if   1=2 and   (), with () > 1.
Note that 8 2 (0; 1) and 8 2 (0; 2), UNBH > 0. S will only care about her
monetary utility. Thus, she will renege on the contract and will obtain:
UNBS = ()

2  (> UNBS = U
NB
H ).
Finally, substituting equation (6) into condition (5) we nd that the class of
equilibria (eNB ; pNB) in NB contracts is non-empty if and only if  > 11+c = .
Note that  > 1=2.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proofs of both parts (a) and (b) follow straightfor-
ward from the fact that S has no interest to maintain reputation in period t if
t = T , or if a B contract is o¤ered from period t+ 1 onwards.
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) Consider a backward induction procedure.
Starting from period T , regardless of the value of  2 (0; 1), consider an equi-
librium in which P o¤ers a prot-maximizing B contract (eB ; pB). This equi-
librium exists because, on one hand, Proposition 1(c) excludes in any period a
28This last result is experimentally corroborated in a two-sided reciprocity setting by En-
glmaier and Leider (2010). They nd that the agent is more willing to reciprocate as the
magnitude of the benet to the principal from his e¤ort increases.
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deviation to an NB contract, and on the other hand, deviating to another B
contract is simply not protable for P . This reasoning applies to all periods
t < T . We now prove that this equilibrium is unique if   . Note that in the
last period T , A would refuse the FB contract due to Lemma 1(a). Consider
then a putative equilibrium where P proposes an NB contract. If    then
UNBH  UBH , thus, A would reject an NB contract because it would only come
from S. Consequently, only a B contract applies in T . Consider now the period
T   1. Due to Lemma 1(b), S will always renege on her promise, therefore, A
would refuse any NB or FB contracts. A similar reasoning applies to all t < T .
Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
(b) Consider the equilibrium where the FB contract is o¤ered in each period
until period t < T and an NB contract is o¤ered thereafter. Consider the last
period T ; we know that a deviation to the FB contract is refused by A due to
Lemma 1(a). A deviation to another NB contract (e.g., by charging a di¤erent
price or by requiring a di¤erent e¤ort level) is also excluded by Proposition 1(c).
Finally, Proposition 2 shows that no deviation to a B contract is protable to P
since  >  > , and the class of equilibria in the NB contracts is non-empty.
Thus an NB contract applies in period T . Suppose now that t < T   1. For
every t 2 [t + 1; T   1],  >  implies that any P has no protable deviation to
a B contract and Proposition 1(c) implies that P has no protable deviation to
another NB contract. Since any breaking of an NB contract would be punished
by A by accepting only B contracts, it is easy to show that S has no protable
deviation to breaking the contract in any period. Then, two conditions must
hold contemporaneously. First, S has a protable deviation to breaking FB in
t + 1. Second, S has no protable deviation to breaking FB in t. Thus, it
must hold that
(t+ 1)UFBP + (T   t  2)UNBP +UNBS < tUFBP +UFBS + (T   t  1)UBP , (7)
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and
tUFBP + (T   t   1)UNBP + UNBS > (t   1)UFBP + UFBS + (T   t)UBP . (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) hold contemporaneously at least for the prot-maximizing
NB contract if  falls in the following interval:
2664

2 + (T   t)

1
1+c
 
2 

1  2

(T   t   1)

1  2

+ 1
3775
2 

<  <
2664

2 + (T   t   1)

1
1+c
 
2 

1  2

(T   t   2)

1  2

+ 1
3775
2 

< 1.
(9)
The endpoints of the interval are increasing in t and T   2 intervals exist with
the lower endpoint for t = 1 equal to:
 =
2664

2 + (T   1)

1
1+c
 
2 

1  2

(T   2)

1  2

+ 1
3775
2 

. (10)
Finally, if t = T   1, condition (7) does not apply because in no circumstance
does A accept an FB contract in the last period due to Lemma 1(b). Condition
(8) applies, meaning that S should have no protable deviation to breaking the
FB contract in t = T   1. Therefore, condition (8) holds if:
"

2
+

1
1 + c
 
2 

1  
2
# 2 
<  < 1. (11)
As expected, the lower endpoint of this interval is equal to the upper endpoint
of the interval in condition (9) when t = T   2. It follows that (T   1) classes
of equilibria exist as  > , with  monotone and increasing in t, and each
class corresponds to di¤erent intervals of  <  < 1, which do not intersect
with each other.29
29Trivially, if the game is played innitely and the discount factor is equal to 1, there exists
36
(c) If  <    then no t exists satisfying condition (8); thus, the FB
contract is never o¤ered in equilibrium. The inequality  >  implies that any P
has no protable deviation to a B contract, and Proposition 1(c) implies that P
has no protable deviation to another NB contract. Finally, since any breaking
of an NB contract would be punished by A by accepting only B contracts, it is
easy to show that S has no protable deviation to breaking the contract in any
period. Consequently, there exists a class of equilibria where an NB contract
applies in each period.
Proof of Lemma 2. This Lemma depends on the fact that principals choose
on the basis of their returns and not on the basis of welfare maximization.
While UBP = WB , the same is not true for NB, where U
NB
P < WNB 8(; ).
Thus, if  > , then UNBP > U
B
P = WB , which trivially implies that WOS 
WB . If    then there exists a region of (; ; c) such that WNB > WB if
(1 + c) >

2 
2 
 2 

. Since the right-hand side of the last inequality is less
than one, increasing in , with lim!0

2 
2 
 2 

= e1 , there exists ^ =
(c) =  productlog[  1(1+c)e ] such that 8 > ^ there exists in turn ^ = (; c)
such that 8  ^ WNB > WB = WOS .
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